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No. 250, August 2011 
he biggest threat for the eurozone is the 
contagion of the Greek sovereign debt 
crisis to the rest of the system. If the Greek 
crisis could be isolated, it would barely matter 
for the eurozone as a whole. After countless 
crisis meetings of the European Council, 
however, it has to be admitted that the European 
leaders have failed to isolate the Greek crisis and 
to stop the forces of contagion. The latest 
meeting of the heads of state or government of 
the euro area on July 21st is no exception. 
Fragility of the eurozone 
Why has it been so difficult to stop the forces of 
contagion? Here is my answer. Government 
bond markets in a monetary union are extremely 
vulnerable. The reason is that national 
governments in a monetary union issue debt in a 
‘foreign’ currency, i.e. one over which they have 
no control. As a result, they cannot guarantee to 
the bondholders that they will always have the 
necessary liquidity to pay out the bond at 
maturity. This contrasts with ‘stand alone’ 
countries that issue sovereign bonds in their own 
currencies. This feature allows these countries to 
guarantee that the cash will always be available 
to pay out the bondholders.  
The absence of such a guarantee makes the 
sovereign bond markets in a monetary union 
prone to forces of contagion, in much the same 
way that banking systems that lack a lender of 
last resort are prone to contagion. In such 
banking systems, solvency problems in one bank 
quickly lead deposit holders of other banks to 
withdraw their deposits, setting in motion a 
generalised crisis. The same risk exists in a 
monetary union when solvency problems in one 
country (Greece) lead bondholders to fear the 
worst in other bond markets and to sell the 
bonds there. This triggers a liquidity crisis in 
these other markets only because there is a fear 
that cash may not be available. The ensuing 
increase in interest rates then turns the liquidity 
crisis into a solvency crisis. Any country can 
become insolvent if the interest rate is pushed 
high enough. Distrust can drive a country in a 
self-fulfilling way into a bad equilibrium.1 
The role of the European Central Bank 
We have learned from the history of banking that 
a necessary2 condition to stabilise the banking 
system consists of providing for a lender of last 
resort. This gives a guarantee to deposit holders 
that the cash will always be available, and 
pacifies them most of the time. The nice thing 
about this solution is that when deposit holders 
                                                      
1 See De Grauwe (2011) where this point is elaborated 
further. See also Kopf (2011). For formal theoretical 
models see Calvo (1988) and Gros (2011). This problem 
also exists with emerging countries that issue debt in a 
foreign currency. See Eichengreen et al. (2005).  
2 Note the use of the word “necessary”, not “sufficient”. 
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are confident that it will be used, it rarely has to 
be invoked.3 
The solution to the contagion problems of the 
banking system is exactly the same solution for a 
monetary union. Contagion between sovereign 
bond markets can only be stopped if there is a 
central bank willing to be the lender of last 
resort, i.e. willing to guarantee that the cash will 
always be available to pay out the bondholders. 
The only institution in the eurozone that can 
perform this role is the European Central Bank. 
Up until recently, the ECB has performed this 
role either directly by buying government bonds, 
or indirectly by accepting government bonds as 
collateral in its liquidity provision to the banking 
system. However, it has made it clear that it is 
unwilling to continue to do so. In fact, since the 
eruption of the Greek crisis in May 2010, the ECB 
has reduced its balance sheet by almost €200 
billion thereby reducing liquidity in the system 
(see Figure 1). 
It made this reduction while the crisis escalated, 
and governments were scrambling to find the 
cash to support Greece. The reluctance of the 
ECB to take up its responsibility as a lender 
of last resort is the single most important 
                                                      
3 See Goodhart & Illing (2002), and of course Bagehot 
(1873).  
factor explaining why the forces of contagion 
in the eurozone’s sovereign bond markets 
has not been stopped. 
Several arguments have been voiced to support 
the view that the ECB should not have a 
responsibility of lender of last resort in the 
government bond markets. Let us discuss these. 
What if the central bank loses money? 
A first and popular argument is that the ECB 
should not have such a responsibility because 
when buying government bonds it risks losing 
money. This is certainly not a good argument. 
When there is confidence that the central bank 
will operate as a lender of last resort in the 
sovereign bond markets, the central bank does 
not have to act as a lender of last resort most of 
the time. Expressed differently, the lender-of-
last-resort function of a central bank is an 
insurance mechanism. It is essential to have such 
a mechanism in place to stabilise the system, but 
it can only assure stability if it 
inspires confidence.4 And only the 
central bank can provide the 
insurance that keeps investors 
confident.5 As with any insurance 
company, however, once in a while 
losses are made, but this is not a good 
reason to stop providing the 
insurance. In addition, contrary to 
private insurance companies, the ECB 
should not really worry about the fact 
that once in a while it loses money. 
What matters is the financial stability 
it ensures, not the profit-and-loss 
account of the central bank.  
This is quite an important point. 
When financial stability is at stake, 
and in the case of the eurozone, when 
its very future is at stake, the last 
thing a central bank should worry 
about is whether it is profitable. It may be 
necessary for the central bank to make losses so 
as to preserve financial stability. In that case, 
these losses are desirable. This is the case even if 
these losses are so large as to wipe out the equity 
of the central bank. In contrast to private firms, 
                                                      
4 See Winkler (2011). 
5 To quote Bagehot (1873): “All our credit system 
depends on the Bank of England for its security.” 
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Figure 1. Total balance sheet of the ECB since May 2010 (€ million)  
Source: ECB, Statistical Data Warehouse. ONLY A MORE ACTIVE ECB CAN SOLVE THE EURO CRISIS | 3 
 
the central bank can live happily with negative 
equity, because the central bank can always fill 
the holes by printing money.6  
What about moral hazard? 
Like with all insurance mechanisms, there is a 
risk of moral hazard. This is the risk that if the 
ECB guarantees that cash will always be 
available to pay out sovereign bond holders, it 
will lead governments to issue too much debt. 
This is indeed a serious risk. But this risk of 
moral hazard is no different from the risk of 
moral hazard in the banking system. It would be 
a terrible mistake if the central bank were to 
abandon its role of lender of last resort in the 
banking sector because there is a risk of moral 
hazard. In the same way, it is wrong for the ECB 
to abandon its role of lender of last resort in the 
government bond market because there is a risk 
of moral hazard.  
The way to deal with moral hazard is to impose 
rules that will constrain governments in issuing 
debt, very much like the banking sector tackles 
moral hazard by imposing limits on risk taking 
by banks. 
Ideally, the lender-of-last-resort function should 
only be used when banks (or governments) 
experience liquidity problems. It should not be 
used when they are insolvent. This is the 
doctrine as formulated by Bagehot (1873). It is 
also very strongly felt by economists in Northern 
Europe (see Plenum der Ökonomen, 2011). The 
central bank should not bail out banks or 
governments that are insolvent.  
This is certainly correct. The problem with this 
doctrine, however, is that it is often difficult to 
distinguish between liquidity and solvency 
crises. Most economists today would agree that 
Greece is insolvent. But what about Spain, 
Ireland, Portugal, Italy and Belgium? The best 
and the brightest economists do not agree on the 
question of whether these countries’ 
governments are just illiquid or whether they 
suffer from a deep solvency problem. How 
would markets know? 
When sovereign debt crises erupt these are very 
often a mix of liquidity and solvency problems. 
                                                      
6 See Buiter (2008) on this. See also Belke & Polleit (2010). 
An issue that arises here (and to which I return later) is 
the extent to which this can lead to inflation. 
Liquidity crises raise the interest rate on the debt 
issued by governments and therefore quickly 
degenerate into solvency problems. Solvency 
problems often lead to liquidity crises that 
intensify the solvency problem. It is therefore 
easy to say that the central bank should only 
provide liquidity to governments or banks that 
are illiquid but solvent. In practice, however, it is 
often very difficult to implement this doctrine. 
In fact, it is even worse than difficult. The 
d o c t r i n e  l e a d s  t o  a  p a r a d o x .  I f  i t  w e r e  e a s y  t o  
separate liquidity from solvency problems, the 
markets would also find it easy to do so. Thus if 
a government came under pressure, financial 
markets would be able to determine whether this 
government suffered from a liquidity or a 
solvency problem. If they determined it was a 
liquidity problem, they would be willing to 
provide credit to the government. The central 
bank would not have to step in. If they 
determined it is a solvency problem, they would 
not want to provide credit and rightly so. The 
Bagehot doctrine would come to the same 
conclusion: the central bank should not bail out 
an insolvent government. The conclusion is that 
if solvency and liquidity crises can be separated, 
there is no need for a lender of last resort. 
Financial markets would take care of the 
problems.7 Who wants to believe this these days?  
What about inflation? 
Another popular argument against an active role 
o f  t h e  E C B  a s  a  l e n d e r  o f  l a s t  r e s o r t  i n  t h e  
sovereign bond market is that this would lead to 
inflation. By buying government bonds the ECB 
increases the money stock, thereby leading to 
more inflation in the future. Doesn’t an increase 
in the money stock always lead to more inflation, 
as Milton Friedman taught us? Two points 
should be made here.  
First, a distinction should be introduced between 
the money base and the money stock. When the 
central bank buys government bonds (or other 
assets), it increases the money base (currency in 
circulation and banks’ deposits at the central 
bank). This does not mean that the money stock 
increases. The period of financial crisis has been 
one during which both monetary aggregates 
became totally disconnected. This is shown in 
                                                      
7 This seems to have been the belief of Alan Greenspan. 
See Greenspan (2007).  4 | PAUL DE GRAUWE 
 
Figure 2. One observes that prior to the banking 
crisis of October 2008, both aggregates were very 
much connected. From October 2008 on, 
however, the disconnect became quite 
spectacular. In order to save the banking system, 
the ECB massively piled up assets on its balance 
sheets, the counterpart of which was a very large 
increase in the money base.8 This very large 
increase in the money base had no effect on the 
money stock (M3) (see Figure 2). 
In fact, the money stock declined until the end of 
2009. The reason why this happened is that 
banks piled up the liquidity provided by the ECB 
without using it to extend credit to the non-
banking sector. Thus, the large liquidity 
injections by the ECB had no impact on inflation 
because they did not increase the money stock. A 
similar phenomenon has been observed in the 
US and the UK.  
Another way to understand this phenomenon is 
to note that when a financial crisis erupts, agents 
w a n t  t o  h o l d  c a s h  f o r  s a f e t y  r e a s o n s .  I f  t h e  
                                                      
8 Note that compared to the US Fed and the Bank of 
England, the expansion of the balance sheet of the ECB 
was much less pronounced. See the data in the 
Appendix. It appears that the ECB has been a timid 
lender of last resort compared to the Fed and the Bank of 
England 
central bank decides not to supply the cash, it 
turns the financial crisis into an economic 
recession and possibly a depression, as agents 
scramble for cash. When instead the central bank 
exerts its function of lender of last resort and 
supplies more money base, it stops this 
deflationary process. But that does not allow us 
to conclude that the central bank is likely to 
create inflation. All this was very well 
understood by Milton Friedman who argued 
that the Great 
Depression was so 
intense because the 
Federal Reserve failed 
to perform its role of 
lender of last resort, 
and did not increase 
the US money base 
sufficiently (see 
Friedman & Schwartz, 
1961).  
A second point to be 
made on this issue is 
that if the ECB is 
afraid that increasing 
the money base during 
times of financial crisis 
will lead to more 
inflation, it can always 
sterilise the effects of 
these operations on 
the money base. Thus, 
if the ECB buys 
Spanish government bonds, thereby increasing 
the money base, it can always reverse this effect 
by selling other assets. As a result, it can keep the 
money base unchanged. The only thing that 
changes is the composition of its assets in the 
balance sheet, not the size of the balance sheets. 
Thus, the ECB can perform its role of lender of 
last resort in the sovereign bond market without 
posing the slightest risk of inflation.  
EFSF and ESM: Poor surrogates 
The ECB’s decision to abandon its role of lender 
of last resort in the government bond market has 
forced the eurozone members to create surrogate 
institutions – the European Financial Stability 
Facility (EFSF) and the future European Stability 
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Figure 2. Money base and M3 in the eurozone (2007=100)
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Mechanism (ESM).9 The problem with these 
institutions is that they will never have the 
necessary credibility to stop the forces of 
contagion, because neither can guarantee that the 
cash will always be available to pay out 
sovereign bond holders. Even if the resources of 
that institution were to be doubled or tripled 
relative to its present level of €440 billion, this 
would not be sufficient. Only a central bank that 
can create unlimited amounts of cash can 
provide such a guarantee.  
In addition, the EFSF (and the future ESM) have 
been designed to solve the twin problems of 
liquidity and solvency. First, the task of the EFSF 
is to provide liquidity to governments 
experiencing a liquidity shortage. This liquidity 
provision role has been strengthened by the 
recent decision of the European Council to allow 
the EFSF to buy government bonds in the 
secondary market. Second, the EFSF also has the 
responsibility for solving the moral hazard 
problem created by liquidity provision. This has 
led the EFSF to impose tough conditions on the 
governments that seek financial assistance.  
These two responsibilities of the EFSF, however, 
are in conflict with each other. When the EFSF is 
guided by moral hazard concerns, it tends to 
restrict and to add conditions to its liquidity 
provisions, thereby preventing the resolution of 
liquidity crises and allowing these to degenerate 
into solvency crises.  
A separation theorem10 
I conclude from the preceding discussion that it 
is better to separate the two functions. Liquidity 
provision should be performed by a central bank 
and the governance of moral hazard by another 
institution, the supervisor. This has been the 
approach taken in the strategy towards the 
banking sector: the central bank assumes the 
responsibility of lender of last resort, thereby 
guaranteeing unlimited liquidity provision in 
times of crisis, irrespective of what this does to 
moral hazard; the supervisory authority takes 
                                                      
9 Gros & Mayer (2010) were the first to propose the 
creation of a European Monetary Fund to substitute for 
the ECB.  
10 Separation theorems are quite popular in economics in 
the belief that separating functions and actions often 
enhances efficiency.  
over the responsibility of regulating and 
supervising the banks.  
This should also be the design of the governance 
within the eurozone. The ECB would assume the 
responsibility of lender of last resort in the 
sovereign bond markets. A different and 
independent authority would take over the 
responsibility of regulating and supervising the 
creation of debt by national governments. To use 
a metaphor: When a house is burning, the fire 
department is responsible for extinguishing the 
fire. Another department (police and justice) is 
responsible for investigating wrongdoing and 
applying punishment if necessary. Both 
functions are kept separate. A fire department 
that is responsible both for putting out the fire 
and punishment is unlikely to be a good fire 
department. The same is true for the EFSF, which 
is supposed to both provide liquidity and 
impose conditions under which this liquidity is 
provided.  
Conclusion 
There is a need for a fundamental overhaul of 
the eurozone’s institutions. In that overhaul it is 
essential that the ECB take on the full 
responsibility of lender of last resort in the 
government bond markets of the eurozone. 
Without this guarantee, the government bond 
markets in the eurozone cannot be stabilised and 
crises will remain endemic.  
At the same time, further steps towards political 
unification must be taken without which 
effective control on national government deficits 
and debts cannot be implemented. Some steps in 
that direction were taken recently when the 
European Council decided to strengthen the 
control on national budgetary processes and on 
national macroeconomic policies. These 
decisions, however, are insufficient and more 
fundamental changes in the governance of the 
eurozone are called for. These changes should be 
such that the central bank can trust that its 
lender of last resort responsibilities in the 
government bond markets will not lead to a 
never-ending dynamics of debt creation.  
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